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transport than most. Very few people can have had anything like your experience except perhaps the stevedores at Atlantic ports? A. Yes, my lord. We found so much trouble with the various steamship lines in handling mechanical transport all over the Atlantic coast that we finally appoint an expert stevedore to do nothing else but go up and down the coast a show the local stevedores how to handle these cases.
Q. So you are not supposed to leave it to the ordinary stevedore?- A. No, not to the ordinary stevedore, my lord.
Q. But to a stevedore who has had special instruction in regard to loading mechanical transport?-A. Yes, my lord; and also you would have to take into consideration the fact that they had never handled any of these cases at Vancouver.
Q. That is what I have in mind. I do not suppose they knew anything about them. (No response).
Q. In the light of what you have just said what is your opinion as a practical matter of the feasibility of getting these universal carriers into No. 1 hold?-A. I can answer that in two ways. In peace time if I was trying to get business away from another steamship company I would put some special man on and try to handle it in the most careful manner possible, and have the same thing done at the other end; but I think much the same procedure would have to be taken in war time, and perhaps a chance taken on doing the best you could to prevent jamming. Q. Where does that leave us as to whether or not, in your view, if those six universal carriers had arrived at Vancouver the stevedores at Vancouver, being who they were, would have caused those six universal carriers to find their way into No. 1 hold?-A. I can only answer that under the circumstances I would have taken a chance on it.
Q. But I gather from what you say that there would have been a very considerable risk of jamming?-A. Yes.
Q. Both at Vancouver and at Hong Kong?-A. Particularly at the destination, my lord.
Q. But you yourself in war time would take the chance, if you had not the proper instruments? That is to say, you had no special man at Vancouver? A. No.
Q. And there would be no special man at Hong Kong, as far as we know?-A. Quite so, my lord.
I accept Mr. Lockwood's evidence. I do not accept Mr. Cook's evidence that it was a simple matter to load these vehicles and that all could have been loaded. The result is that had these vehicles arrived on October 27 before the ship sailed, and had the Captain been willing to accept them about fifteen out of the twenty vehicles might possibly have been loaded. Mr. Lockwood seems to have thought that seven trucks and the two water tanks could have been loaded but the evidence as to whether the Captain would have been willing to take any of these vehicles enables me to form no confident opinion on this point.
There remains the further question as to whether there resulted to the expedition any detriment or injury by reason of the fact that these twenty vehicles did not accompany the troops. In my view it can be said at once that, so far as the twelve 15 ewt. trucks are concerned, there was no such result, and we have it in a cable from Brigadier Lawson at Hong Kong on November 24 that transport was being hired as required. Hong Kong is, or was, a large city and it is apparent that trucks were available and were obtained for the use of the Canadian force. If that was so before hostilities began, I have no doubt it did not cease to be so after hostilities broke out.
The two water tanks are, of course, specially built tanks on a chassis. Whether or not the British garrison had a reserve of these vehicles which were
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made available to the Canadian force cannot be known. Equally it cannot be known whether the force was able to use ordinary trucks for the purpose of carrying water in some sort of receptacle. In the absence of evidence, I can ake no finding as to whether or not the force suffered from lack of these two
hicles.
With regard to the six carriers, they are simply a means of getting a Bren gun crew, or mortar crew, across country quickly. They are not fighting vehicles in the sense that a tank is. A truck would serve equally well where there are roads. Again it is not known whether the British garrison had car- riers with which the force could have been, or was supplied, but, even if that were not the case, it cannot be said that the absence of these six carriers would prevent the force from carrying, or using their Bren guns and mortars. These weapons are designed to be carried by their crews and the "carriers" are for the purpose of quick transportation. The Bren gun weighs 23 pounds and the tripod 30 pounds, or 53 pounds in all. The 3-inch mortar is carried, including ammunition by a crew of four. The heaviest load for any man is 60 pounds. On the evidence I cannot find that there was any detriment suffered by the force through the absence of the six carriers. That must remain a matter of speculation.
C.G.S.
M.G.O.
A.G.
Q.M.G. M.S. DEFENSOR
OTTAWA
FOR C.G.S.
Copy Exhibit 44
TELEGRAM
30th OCTOBER, 1941
LONDON, 30th OCT. 1941
FROM C.J.G.S.
M 0 2 B
WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR DESPATCHING YOUR CONTINGENT TO HONG KONG AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE. WE FULLY REALISE THE DIFFICULTIES OF MOBILISATION AND OF DISTANCE WHICH HAVE HAD TO BE OVERCOME. THE MORAL EFFECT OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN NOVEMBER WILL BE MUCH GREATER THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TWO MONTHS LATER.
TROOPER.
Exhibit 45 Copy
LONDON, 26th Oct., 1941.
Consensus opinion that war in Far East unlikely
Extract from Canmilitry G.S. 2332:
Para, nine
at present.
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